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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the theoretical relationship between law and ethics. Its 
methodology is informed by both the existentialist tradition of ethical phenomenology 
and the natural law tradition in legal theory.  
 
The main claim of the thesis is that a phenomenological analysis of ethical 
experience, as suggested by the writings of existentialist authors such as Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas, provides important support for the natural law 
tradition. This claim is developed and defended through detailed engagement with the 
natural law theory of John Finnis.  
 
Specifically, I contend that Finnis’ account of moral reasoning as applying the 
principles of practical reasonableness to a context of self-evident, basic values gains 
significant support from a phenomenological theory of ethical experience. Finnis’ 
emphasis on the irreducible role of choice in moral deliberation also finds support in 
the existentialist tradition. However, I criticise some key aspects of Finnis’ theory, 
including his emphasis on the transcendental character of the basic values and his 
account of legal obligation.  
 
I begin by outlining some central features of the existentialist approach to philosophy. 
I advance an interpretation of existentialism as ethical phenomenology. I then discuss 
some possible methodological connections between the existentialist and natural law 
traditions. This discussion provides the methodological framework for the remainder 
of the thesis. 
 
The thesis develops and defends a substantially original theory of the relationships 
between law, ethics and politics. The exposition begins with an account of the 
relationship between law and community that draws upon the work of Finnis and G. 
W. F. Hegel. I then outline a phenomenological theory of ethical experience, drawing 
in particular on the writings of Sartre and Levinas.  
 
I employ this phenomenological account of ethics to develop a conception of moral 
reasoning as reflective, good faith engagement with pre-reflective social judgements 
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of ethical significance. This view of ethical experience and moral reasoning is then 
used as the basis for an examination of the concept of law and its relationship to 
political discourse. 
 
I turn next to the notions of legal authority and obligation. I argue that law, in the 
focal sense of the term, presents a generic, peremptory obligation that is necessarily 
moral in character. In the course of the argument, I critically discuss the conceptions 
of legal authority proposed by Joseph Raz, Adolf Reinach, H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, 
Finnis, Jacques Derrida and Hans Kelsen. 
 
This view of legal obligation entails there are fundamental moral conditions that 
positive rules must satisfy to qualify as law, in the focal sense. I explore the nature of 
the moral framework created by these conditions through a detailed analysis of the 
ethical foundations of political discourse.   
 
I argue that political discourse is founded upon an ontological apprehension of the 
nature of humans as free, ethical beings, which finds expression in a developed notion 
of political freedom. I suggest that the distinction between positive and negative forms 
of freedom advanced by Isaiah Berlin is best understood in terms of the different 
types of political claims invoked by those conceptions. I develop this theory by 
reference to the work of Charles Taylor, Gerald C. MacCallum, Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, W. D. Ross, Robert Nozick and F. A. Hayek. 
 
I conclude by discussing the role of ethical experience in the interpretation of legal 
materials. I argue that ethical judgements play an irreducible role in constructing the 
natural interpretive context for judicial reasoning. I engage with the work of Hart, Lon 
L. Fuller, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ferdinand de Saussure and 
Ronald Dworkin, among others.  
 
In the final substantive chapter of the thesis, the potential for ethical judgements to 
play a constructive role in judicial action is illustrated through a detailed discussion of 
the doctrine of government neutrality. 
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